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ABSTRACT
Introduction: Based upon Reason’s model of human error, the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was developed as
an analytical framework for the investigation of the role of human
error in aviation accidents. However, there is little empirical work
that formally describes numerically the relationship between the levels
and components in the model (the organizational structures,
psychological pre-cursors of errors and actual errors). Method: This
research analyzed 523 accidents in the Republic of China (ROC) Air
Force between 1978 and 2002 through the application of the HFACS
framework. Results: The results revealed several key relationships
between errors at the operational level and organizational inadequacies
at both the immediately adjacent level (preconditions for unsafe acts)
and higher levels in the organization (unsafe supervision and
organizational influences). Conclusions: This research lends support
to Reason’s model that suggests that active failures are promoted by
latent conditions in the organization. Fallible decisions in upper
command levels were found to directly affect supervisory practices,
thereby creating preconditions for unsafe acts and hence indirectly
impaired performance of pilots, leading to accidents. The HFACS
framework was proven to be a useful tool for guiding accident
investigations and developing accident prevention strategies.
Keywords: Accident Investigation; Human Error; Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System (HFACS)
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the focus on human error in aviation accidents has
shifted away from skill deficiencies and toward decision-making,
attitudes, supervisory factors and organizational culture as being
the primary contributory factors (3, 9 & 10). This change in emphasis
has resulted in several human error frameworks and accident
investigation schemes being developed (e.g. 3, 7 & 22) aimed at gaining
a more complete understanding of the circumstances surrounding the
accident and hence aid in the development of effective prevention
strategies.
Dekker (2) proposed that human errors are systematically connected
to features of operators’ tools and tasks, and error has its roots
in the organizational system. In a similar vein, Orasanu and Connolly
(16) suggested that decision-making often occurs in an organizational
context, and that the organization influences pilots’ decisions
directly by stipulating standard operating procedures, and indirectly
through its norms and culture. Maurino et al. (15) pointed out that
it is important to understand how decisions made by pilots are
influenced by the actions of management at the higher levels in their
organizations. However, there is little empirical work describing
the statistical associations between organizational structures and
the actual errors committed by pilots.
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - HFACS (20,
21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 & 28) is derived from Reason’s (17, 18)
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organizationally based model of human error. In this model active
failures (errors) of front-line operators combine with latent failures
lying dormant in the system to breach its defenses. These latent
failures are spawned in the upper levels of the organization and are
related to management and regulatory structures. Wiegmann & Shappell
(25) claim that the HFACS framework bridges the gap between theory
and practice by providing safety professionals with a theoretically
based tool for identifying and classifying the human errors in aviation
mishaps. Given that the system focuses on both latent and active
failures and their inter-relationships, it facilitates the
identification of the underlying causes of human error. HFACS was
originally designed and developed as a human error framework for
investigating and analyzing human error accidents in US military
aviation operations (21) however the framework’s developers have also
demonstrated its applicability to the analysis of accidents in US
commercial aviation (21, 24, 25 & 26) and US general aviation (22).
Beaubien and Baker (1) criticized the validation evidence
supporting the utility of the HFACS system as it was all collected
and analyzed by the developers of the framework. However, other authors
have now successfully used and proven the system outside the US, for
example in Taiwan and India (13 & 4), and also other applications of
the HFACS methodology are now being reported. The system has been used
to analyze the underlying human factors causes in accidents involving
remotely-piloted aircraft (23); an adaptation of the method (HFACS-ME)
has been developed to investigate maintenance error (11) and a further
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adaptation of the system has been developed for the investigation of
railroad accidents (HFAC-RR; ref. 19).
HFACS addresses human errors at four levels. The framework is
described diagrammatically in figure 1. Level 1 (unsafe acts of
operators - active failures) is the level at which the majority of
accident investigations are focused. Failures at this level can be
classified into two categories; errors and violations. Level 2
(preconditions for unsafe acts - latent/active failures) addresses
the latent failures within the causal sequence of events as well as
the more obvious active failures. It also describes the substandard
conditions of operators and the substandard practices that they
perform. Level 3 (unsafe supervision - latent failures) traces the
causal chain of events producing unsafe acts up to the level of the
front-line supervisors. Level 4 (organizational influences - latent
failures) describes the contributions of fallible decisions in upper
levels of management that directly affect supervisory practices, as
well as the conditions and actions of front-line operators. Each higher
level affects the next downward level in HFACS framework. However,
only one of the papers cited previously (23) reports any statistical
relationships describing empirically the associations between the
tiers in the model in an attempt to validate the presumed causal links
between latent failures and the unsafe acts of the operator. What
is more, this research was concerned with the operation of uninhabited
air vehicles.
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
---------------------------------------------
This research applied the HFACS framework to ROC Air Force
accidents. The objective was to provide probabilities for the
co-occurrence of categories across adjacent levels of the HFACS to
establish how factors in the upper (organizational) levels in the
framework affect categories in lower (operational) levels. Once the
significant paths in the framework have been identified, the
development of accident intervention strategies should proceed more
rapidly and effectively.
METHOD
Data
The data were derived from the narrative descriptions of accidents
occurring in the ROC Air Force between 1978 and 2002. The data set
comprised of all 523 accidents occurring during this 25-year period
and for the purposes of analysis can therefore be considered to be
the entire population of ROC Air Force accidents during this period
(14). The data comprised 206 (39.4%) class-1 accidents (cost to repair
over 65% of original price or resulted in death of the crew), 78 (14.9%)
class-2 accidents (cost to repair between 35 and 65% of original price
or crew sustained serious injury) and 239 (45.7%) class-3 accidents
(cost to repair between 3-35% of original price or crewmember sustained
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minor injury). Fighter aircraft were involved in 67.5% of accidents;
training aircraft in 21.6% and cargo aircraft in 10.9%. Accidents
occurred during missions including air interception; air combat
tactics; instrument flight; cross-country; surface attack; close
pattern; formation; and test flight.
The Aviation Safety Unit (ASU) is responsible for all ROC Air
Force accident investigation. For each accident involving a military
aircraft, the 24-hour on call Investigator-In-Charge follows a standard
procedure for conducting the investigation. The initial stage collects
relevant information for further analysis including the accident
classification; identification details; pilots’ information;
personnel involved; aircraft information; mission and flight details;
history of flight; impact and post-impact information; meteorological
information; radar information and transmissions to and from Tactical
Air Traffic Control. The wreckage of the aircraft is then recovered
for investigation by the engineering teams. The final report details
the causal factors of the accident and contains recommendations for
accident prevention.
Classification framework
This study used the version of the HFACS framework described in
Wiegmann & Shappell (27). The first (operational) level of HFACS
categorizes events under the general heading of ‘unsafe acts of
operators’ that can lead to an accident. This comprises four
sub-categories of 'decision errors'; 'skill-based errors'; 'perceptual
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errors' and ‘violations’. The second level of HFACS concerns
'preconditions for unsafe acts' which has seven further sub-categories:
'adverse mental states'; 'adverse physiological states';
'physical/mental limitations'; 'crew resource management'; 'personal
readiness'; 'physical environment', and 'technological environment'.
The third level of HFACS is ‘unsafe supervision’ which includes
'inadequate supervision'; 'planned inappropriate operation'; 'failure
to correct known problem', and 'supervisory violation'. The fourth
and highest level of HFACS is ‘organizational influences’ and comprises
of the sub-categories of 'resource management'; 'organizational
climate' and 'organizational process'. HFACS is described
diagrammatically in figure 1.
Coding process
Each accident report was coded independently by two investigators,
an instructor pilot and an aviation psychologist. These investigators
were trained on the HFACS framework together for 10 hours to ensure
that they achieved a detailed and accurate understanding to the
categories of the HFACS. The training process consisted of three
half-day modules delivered by an aviation psychologist. The training
contents included an introduction to the HFACS framework; an
explanation of the definitions of the four different levels of HFACS;
and a further detailed description of the content of the eighteen HFACS
categories in the context of military operations. The raters also
jointly analyzed two years of the ROC accident data to develop a common
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understanding of the process and achieve a common understanding of
the categories.
The presence (coded 1) or the absence (coded 0) of each HFACS
category was assessed in each accident report narrative. To avoid
over-representation from any single accident, each HFACS category was
counted a maximum of only once per accident. The count acted simply
as an indicator of presence or absence of each of the 18 categories
in a given accident. In total instances of 1762 category assignments
were made to described the causal factors underlying the 523 accidents
coded.
The inter-rater reliabilities calculated on a
category-by-category basis were assessed using Cohen’s Kappa. The
values obtained ranged between 0.44 and 0.83 (see table 1). Fourteen
HFACS categories exceeded a Kappa of 0.60 indicating substantial
agreement (12). As Cohen’s Kappa can produce misleadingly low figures
for inter-rater reliability where the sample size is small or where
there is very high agreement between raters associated with a large
proportion of cases falling into one category (8), inter-rater
reliabilities were also calculated as a simple percentage rate of
agreement. These showed reliability figures between 72.3% and 96.4%,
further indicating acceptable reliability between the raters. See
Li & Harris (13) for further details.
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Analysis
The data were cross tabulated to describe the association between
the categories at adjacent levels in the HFACS analytical framework.
 Goodman and Kruskall’s (5) lambda (λ) was used to calculate the 
proportional reduction in error (PRE). The Lambda statistic is
analogous to the R squared statistic for continuous data. For
categorical data (such as that found in contingency tables), its value
reflects the PRE when predicting the outcome category from simply the
baseline prevalence as compared to using information from the
predictive category (i.e. predicting lower from higher levels of
HFACS). For the purposes of this study the lower level categories
in the HFACS were designated as being dependent upon the categories
at the immediately higher level in the framework, which is congruent
with the theoretical assumptions underlying HFACS: from this
standpoint, lower levels in the HFACS cannot affect higher levels.
Finally, odds ratios were also calculated which provide an estimate
of the likelihood of the presence of a contributory factor in one HFACS
category being associated concomitantly with the presence of a factor
in another category. However, it must be noted that odds ratios are
an asymmetric measure and so are only theoretically meaningful when
associated with a non-zero value for lambda.
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RESULTS
The frequency of occurrence of the individual causal factors coded
in the analysis of the 523 accidents is given in table 1. Relatively
few categories had exceptionally low counts. Only the categories of
‘organizational climate’ (level-4); ‘supervisory violation’ (level-3)
and ‘adverse physiological state’ (level-2) failed to achieve double
figures.
---------------------------------------------
INSERT Table 1 HERE
---------------------------------------------
The results reported in this paper pertain only to the instances
where the PRE (when predicting the lower level HFACS category from
the higher level category) was in excess of 5%.
Examination of the lambda statistic showed only one association
between categories at level-4 and level-3 (‘organizational process’
with ‘inadequate supervision’) in which the PRE exceeded 5%. This
association was between ‘organizational process’ with ‘inadequate
supervision’ (λ = 0.282). It also had a high odds ratio, suggesting
that poor supervisory practices were 13.561 times more likely to occur
when associated with poor managerial processes in the air force.
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---------------------------------------------
INSERT Figure 2 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Calculation of the lambda statistics showed that there was only
one association between the level-3 and level-2 categories of
‘inadequate supervision’ and ‘crew resource management’ in which the
PRE exceeded 5% (λ = 0.281). This relationship again had a high odds
ratio, suggesting that poor supervisory practices were 12.78 times
more likely to subsequently result in poor CRM.
Examination of the lambda statistics showed there to be eight
associations between level-2 and level-1 HFACS categories where the
PRE exceeded 5%. These were ‘adverse mental states’ with ‘decision
errors’ and ‘skill-based errors’; ‘physical/mental limitations’ with
‘decision errors’ and ‘skill-based errors’; ‘crew resource management’
with ‘decision errors’ and ‘skill-based errors’; and ‘personal
readiness’ with the categories of ‘decision errors’ and ‘skill-based
errors’. These relationships are summarized in table 2 and described
diagrammatically in figure 2. All these relationships were also
associated with high odds ratios, suggesting that inadequate
performance in the higher level HFACS categories was associated with
much increased levels of poor performance at the lower levels.
---------------------------------------------
INSERT Table 2 HERE
---------------------------------------------
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DISCUSSION
It can be seen from the data presented in table 1 that the vast
majority of HFACS categories had large numbers of instances of
occurrence in the data set, which allows reasonable confidence in the
pattern of results obtained. Only three categories had low frequencies
of occurrence. Interestingly, these low frequency counts were not
associated with any one HFACS level in particular, but it can be
suggested that the low numbers may reflect either the sensitivity of
the issues they address (e.g. ‘adverse physiological states’ and
‘supervisory violations’) or because they deal with a less tangible
issues (‘organizational climate’). In a similar vein Harris (6) noted
that in the post-hoc coding of incident data the categories showing
the lowest level of reliability were those that required either a great
deal of inference on the part of the assessors when coding the data
or the ones that dealt with more abstract concepts, such as inferring
a lack of ‘situational awareness’ or in this case identifying
‘organizational climate’ as a contributory factor. It is suggested
that perhaps the raters may have been disinclined to utilize this
category in this study in preference to something less abstract where
there was more tangible evidence available from the accident report
narratives, for example ‘organizational process’.
Reason (17 & 18) has suggested that there is a ‘many to one’ mapping
of the psychological precursors of unsafe acts to the actual errors
themselves, making it difficult to predict which actual errors will
occur as a result of which preconditions. This research, using the
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HFACS framework developed by Wiegmann & Shappell (20, 21, 22, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28) goes some way to supporting this assertion. There are
associations between factors at higher organizational levels, the
psychological contributory factors and the errors committed by pilots
(see figure 2). However, some care needs to be taken when interpreting
these relationships as the frequency counts within categories were
all derived from accidents. It is unknown (and unknowable) how often
instances within the various HFACS categories have occurred in
day-to-day operations that have not resulted in an accident. Thus,
the relationships between HFACS levels and categories should not be
interpreted outside the accident causal sequence.
Reason (17) proposed that latent conditions are present in all
systems and they are an inevitable part of organizational life. For
example, resources are normally distributed unequally in
organizations. The original decision on how to allocate resources
may have been based on sound commercial arguments, but such inequities
may create reliability or safety problems for someone somewhere in
the system at some later point. This investigation showed that at
HFACS level-4 ‘organizational influences’, the category of
‘organizational process’ had an association with the category of
‘inadequate supervision’ at level-3 (‘unsafe supervision’). Poor
‘organizational processes’ were associated with inadequacies in
supervision and hence were ultimately, albeit indirectly, at the root
of many operational errors resulting in accidents. Well-developed
‘organizational processes’ that are consistently adhered to are key
to all safety management systems. The commitment to safety must come
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right from the very highest levels of the organization if it is to
be successful in this respect (18). Both Reason (17 & 18) and Wiegmann
& Shappell (27) hypothesized that inappropriate decision-making by
upper-level management can adversely influence the personnel and
practices at the supervisory level, which in turn affects the
psychological pre-conditions and hence the subsequent actions of the
front-line operators. This study provides support for this
relationship. Furthermore, the odds ratios associated with
‘supervisory failures’ were over 13 times more likely to occur in the
presence of a concomitant failure in the category of ‘organizational
process’.
The category of ‘inadequate supervision’ was the key factor at
HFACS level-3. It had a particularly strong association with the
level-2 category of ‘Crew Resource Management’. The failure of senior
officers in a supervisory position to provide guidance and operational
doctrine to pilots through promoting good resource management practices
was subsequently indirectly associated with active, operational
failures. Again, the odds ratios suggested failures as a result of
poor CRM practices were almost 13 times more likely to occur in the
presence of a concomitant failure in the category of ‘supervisory
failure’. This would seem to be a key area for risk reduction.
Reason (17) suggested that human behavior is governed by the
interplay between psychological and situational factors. Several
pre-conditions for unsafe acts (at HFACS level-2) show strong
associations with the active failures of the operators at level-1.
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These level-2 factors show Reason’s classic ‘many to one’ mapping of
psychological precursors to active failures in all of the level-1
categories with the exception of the category of ‘violations’ which
suggests that a completely different mechanism is at play here to cause
such failures (see table 2 and figure 2).
It will be noted from the results presented diagrammatically in
figure 2 that there are relatively few associations between HFACS
categories at adjacent organizational levels, where the lower level
categories were associated with a moderately large proportional
reduction in error (lambda statistic) with a higher-level category.
However, there are several key associations which strongly suggest
where safety interventions are likely to have the greatest potential
impact.
The results suggest that interventions at HFACS levels 1 and 2
would only have limited effect in improving overall safety. As an
example, improving CRM practices alone is unlikely to have a major
impact on safety unless the supervisory processes (level-3) and
organizational processes (level-4) are in place to provide facilities;
oversee CRM training; monitor its effectiveness and respond to any
further changes required in the training program. All of these
activities require organizational commitment and capacity, which can
only be provided from the highest levels of management. Furthermore,
on a ‘dollar-for-dollar’ basis, interventions at higher levels are
also likely to be more cost effective in the net safety benefits they
realize. Specific targets for remedial safety action should be aimed
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in the areas that share the strongest and greatest number of
demonstrable associations with lower levels in the organization (for
example, ‘organizational process’, ‘inadequate supervision’ and ‘Crew
Resource Management’. These are the categories at the root of the
paths of association with other HFACS categories that have very high
values for the odds ratios associated with them. This would further
suggest that the greatest gains in safety benefit could be achieved
by targeting these areas.
CONCLUSIONS
The large sample of accident and incidents in the present study
has allowed extensive analysis of the inter-relationships between the
categories and levels in the HFACS thereby providing some empirical
evidence to support its theoretical structure. The accidents and
incidents analyzed all occurred in the ROC Air Force thus the patterns
of inter-relationships reported may be culturally specific. However
there is no reason why this analytical methodology cannot be employed
on other data sets to establish if the patterns observed hold good
in other cultures, thereby providing further evidence to support the
HFACS methodology.
This study provides an understanding, based upon empirical
evidence, of how actions and decisions at higher levels in the
organization promulgate throughout the ROC Air Force to result in
operational errors and accidents. This has not previously been done
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with data analyzed using the HFACS. There are a few, clearly defined
paths that relate errors at level-1 (the operational level) with
inadequacies at both the immediately adjacent and higher levels in
the organization. This research draws a clear picture that go some
way to support Reason’s (17) model of active failures resulting from
latent conditions in the organization. Furthermore, the HFACS framework
has been proven to be a useful tool for guiding accident investigations
and for targeting potentially cost-effective remedial safety actions.
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TABLE I
Table I FREQUENCY COUNTS AND INTER-RATER RELIABILITY STATISTICS FOR
EACH HFACS CATEGORY FOR ALL 523 ACCIDENTS. NOTE THAT THE
PERCENTAGES IN THE TABLE WILL NOT EQUAL 100%, BECAUSE IN MANY
CASES MORE THAN ONE CAUSAL FACTOR WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
ACCIDENT.
HFACS Category
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Co
he
n’
s
Ka
pp
a
%
Ag
re
em
en
t
Organizational process 76 14.5 0.59 87.4
Organizational climate 4 0.8 0.44 96.4
Level-4,
Organizational
Influences Resource management 184 35.2 0.77 86.4
Supervisory violation 8 1.5 0.69 96.2
Failed correct a known problem 12 2.3 0.54 95.8
Planned inadequate operations 24 4.6 0.71 94.6
Level-3,
Unsafe
Supervision
Inadequate supervision 177 33.8 0.83 89.7
Technology environment 44 8.4 0.61 89.9
Physical environment 74 14.1 0.80 92.2
Personal readiness 29 5.5 0.70 72.3
Crew resource management 146 27.9 0.80 89.7
Physical/mental limitation 73 14.0 0.69 90.4
Adverse physiological states 2 0.4 0.44 96.4
Level-2,
Preconditions
for Unsafe Acts
Adverse mental states 184 35.2 0.75 86.0
Violations 160 30.6 0.70 84.9
Perceptual errors 116 22.2 0.67 85.1
Skilled-based errors 226 43.2 0.71 83.4
Level-1,
Unsafe Acts of
Operators
Decision errors 223 42.6 0.68 81.5
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TABLE II
TABLE II GOODMAN AND KRUSKALL’S LAMBDA AND ODDS RATIOS SUMMARISING
SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CATEGORIES AT THE LEVEL OF
‘PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS’ AND AT THE SUBSEQUENT LEVEL
OF ‘UNSAFE ACTS OF OPERATORS’
Precondition for Unsafe Acts
With Unsafe Acts of Operators
Lambda
(PRE)
Odds
ratio
Adverse mental state *
Decision errors
.269 4.364
Adverse mental states *
Skill-based errors
.283 4.518
Physical/mental limitation *
Decision errors .211 7.730
Physical/mental limitation *
Skill-based errors .164 4.735
Crew resource management *
Decision errors
.215 3.724
Crew resource management *
Skill-based errors
.195 3.299
Personal readiness *
Decision errors .058 3.613
Personal readiness *
Skill-based errors .075 5.231
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Figure Captions
FIGURE I. THE HFACS FRAMEWORK (WIEGMANN & SHAPPELL, 2003).
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FIGURE II. PATHS BETWEEN CATEGORIES AT THE FOUR LEVELS IN THE HFACS
FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE PRE (LAMBDA - λ) VALUE IS IN EXCESS 
OF 5%.
